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While there is much debate about the inter-jurisdictional effect
of the new civil unions created in Vermont, this Note approaches the
problem from a new perspective. Currently, a few states boast
statutory frameworks that confer on parties to non-marital same-sex
relationships the substantial benefits traditionally afforded only to
married couples. What effect, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution must one of these progressive states give to a
same-sex union created in another? This Note discusses that question
specifically with regard to California and Vermont and will be limited
to California's obligation-as a state that already provides same-sex
couples some of the rights traditionally available only to married
couples-to give full faith and credit to a civil union created in
Vermont.
Although California is fertile ground for a claim to the full faith
and credit of Vermont's civil union because of its domestic
partnership statutes, uncertainties and complexities abound. Because
the civil union is not a marriage by definition, it is therefore uncertain
whether various marriage-evasion statutes apply to it at all. A full
faith and credit analysis often demands extending a state's policy on a
comparable local law to the foreign law in question. However,
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because the civil union is dissimilar to its closest counterpart in
California, it is difficult to know exactly what is California's policy
regarding the Vermont civil union. Furthermore, because the civil
union is so similar to a marriage and yet not identical, it is difficult to
know which analyses may be borrowed from local marriage policy
and which may not.
Part I of this Note will discuss, in brief, the history of law reform
during the last ten years with respect to same-sex marriages and
same-sex legal relationships. In doing so, it will set the stage for the
discussion of full faith and credit. Part II will discuss major issues
regarding full faith and credit with respect to the civil union. This
section considers what marriage-evasion statutes apply, what impact
the federal Defense of Marriage Act has on civil unions, and whether
a civil union is an "act" within the meaning of the clause. Finally,
Part III will discuss California policy on full faith and credit and
same-sex relationships, looking specifically at California's policy on
enforcing the statutes of sister states, marriage-evasion generally, and
same-sex unions. Ultimately, this Note will argue that California
policy mandates that a local court must recognize the benefits
conferred upon a person who entered into a civil union in the state of
Vermont.
I. Background
A. In the Beginning There Was Only Marriage:
Full Faith and Credit & Lex Loci
Originally, marriage had no same-sex counterpart in the
American legal system. The effect that a state gave to a foreign
marriage or statute was settled by traditional conflicts of law
principles. Those principles operate differently in different situations.
In a situation involving the laws of a state and a foreign country, for
example, a state may apply its own principles without federal
intervention subject only to what restrictions may arise out of
international treaties.' In contrast, in a situation involving the laws of
two sister states, a state's own principles of conflicts take a back seat
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the United States Constitution.2 In the situation of
marriages specifically, under traditional choice-of-law principles, the




validity of a marriage contracted in a another state is generally
determined by the law of the state in which it was celebrated or
contracted This is the rule of lex loci contractus.' As applied in some
jurisdictions, section 283(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Law takes a slightly different approach:
The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the
principles stated in [the section pertaining to general choice of law
principles].... A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the
state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of
another state which had the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.4
By the foregoing formulation, it once appeared that if a single
state decided to legalize same-sex marriage, its forty-nine sister states
would likely be obligated to recognize such a marriage if validly
contracted. As a result, the last decade was an exciting and
controversial era in law reform for advocates and opponents of same-
sex marriages and partnerships.
B. Hawaii and Baehr v. Lewin
The action began in Hawaii in May 1993 when the state supreme
court handed down its now-famous Baehr v. Lewin decision In
Baehr, several applicants' marriage licenses were denied solely on the
ground that the applicants were of the same sex.' Those applicants
filed a complaint on May 1, 1991, alleging a violation of their right to
privacy and equal protection as guaranteed by the Hawaii
Constitution.7 The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the Hawaii
Constitution does not give rise to a fundamental right of persons of
the same sex to marry.8
Nonetheless, the court did draw specific attention to Hawaii
Revised Statute section 572-1. Section 572-1 restricted marital
relations to those between a male and female.' The court held that
this statute established a sex-based classification which is subject to
"strict scrutiny" in an equal protection challenge."' The court
3. 32 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Family Law § 72 (1994).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
5. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
6. Id. at 49.
7. Id. at 50.
8. Id. at 57.
9. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (Supp. 2001).
10. Baehr. 852 P.2d at 68.
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therefore vacated the circuit court's grant of Lewin's motion on the
pleadings, and remanded the matter for further proceedings to
determine if the statute met the strict scrutiny challenge." The trial
court was instructed that on remand the burden would rest on the
defendant to overcome the presumption that the statute was
unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers a compelling state
interest and is "narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of
constitutional rights."' 2
On December 3, 1996, the trial court enjoined the state from
denying the license based on sex.'3 The court found the sex-based
statutory classification, on its face and as applied, unconstitutional
and in violation of the equal protection clause of article I, section 5 of
the Hawaii Constitution. 4 On January 23, 1996, the Hawaii Supreme
Court affirmed.'5
It thus appeared that the plaintiffs had won an enormous victory
for the advancement of same-sex marriages. It seemed that if Hawaii
were to legalize same-sex marriages, other states would be required
to recognize such marriages absent a strong policy against them.
Many feared that this radical development in Hawaii could effectively
control the development of same-sex marriage jurisprudence across
the country.
In response, however, the Hawaii legislature proposed a state
constitutional amendment. 6 The proposed amendment was passed
by election on November 3, 1998.1 Article I, section 23 of the Hawaii
Constitution now provides that "[t]he legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."'" The legislature,
seemingly in an attempt to circumvent another equal protection
claim, contemporaneously passed the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act,"




13. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
14. Id.
15. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112, 116 (Haw. 1996).
16. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (Supp. 2001).
20. See id.
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C. The Defense of Marriage Act
In the two-year gap between Baehr v. Miike and the amendment
to article I of the Hawaii Constitution, new federal and state
legislation appeared. In October 1996, Congress passed the Defense
of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). 2' The DOMA is codified in two parts,
providing:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage"
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.22
and:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
2
Although its constitutionality is not universally accepted by legal
scholars, the effect of the DOMA is that a state would not be
required to recognize a Hawaiian same-sex marriage under full faith
and credit. Furthermore, the DOMA signals that the federal
government will not recognize same-sex marriages for any federal
purposes or benefits such as, but not limited to, federal income
taxation benefits. 24 This law seemed to eliminate the possibility that
Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act could have a national impact
on the rights of same-sex couples. Vermont soon changed the
landscape.
D. Vermont and Baker v. State
On December 20, 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Baker v. State.25 In Baker, three same-sex couples
filed a complaint against the State of Vermont, the towns of Milton
and Shelburne, and the City of South Burlington." The trial court
dismissed the complaint, ruling that the marriage statutes could not
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
22. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
24. See 1 U.S.C. § 7.
25. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
26. Id. at 867-68.
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be construed to permit the issuance of a license to same-sex couples.27
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that under the
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution," "plaintiffs
may not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections
afforded to persons of the opposite sex who choose to marry."2 The
Common Benefits Clause provides, in pertinent part:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or
community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of
any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of
that community. 3"
Justice Amestoy wrote:
We hold that the State is constitutionally required to extend to
same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow
from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes
the form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a
parallel "domestic partnership" system or some equivalent
statutory alternative, rests with the legislature. Whatever system is
chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional imperative
to afford all Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and
security of the law.3'
The legislature was thus charged with devising a scheme to
provide same-sex couples the same benefits accorded to married
couples. On April 25, 2000, the Vermont legislature chose such a
system and passed the Vermont Civil Union bill, 2 which became fully
effective January 1, 2001." The enacted bill distinguished the civil
union from marriage but extended to same-sex members of the union
all the benefits extended to married couples." The act provided:
Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections
and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute,
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other
source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage."s
The civil union bill specifically defined marriage to mean "the
legally recognized union of one man and one woman."36 A "civil
27. Id. at 868.
28. VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 7.
29. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
30. VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 7.
31. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
32. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §§ 1201-07 (Supp. 2001).
33. See Elaine M. De Franco, Comment, Choice of Law: Will a Wisconsin Court
Recognize a Vermont Civil Union?, 85 MARo. L. REv. 251, 255-56 (2001).
34. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07.
35. Id. § 1204(a).
36. Id. § 1201(4).
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union," by contrast, "means that two eligible persons have established
a relationship pursuant to [the chapter on civil unions], and may
receive the benefits and protections and be subject to the
responsibilities of spouses."37 Parties may not enter into a civil union
with a person closely related by blood:" Nor may a party to a civil
union be in another civil union or marriage. " In short, members of a
civil union face the same responsibilities and receive the same
benefits of married couples at the state level."' At the federal level, of
course, the DOMA prevents true parity with married couples.
E. State Defense of Marriage Acts
The federal DOMA was not the only player in the inter-
jurisdictional restriction of same-sex rights. In response to Baehr and
Baker, many states enacted marriage-evasion statutes-sometimes
referred to as "little DOMAs"-of their own. However, these state
statutes came in many different forms. For example, in March 2000,
California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 22, a ballot
initiative that essentially disavowed recognition of same-sex
marriages." The proposition was codified and made effective the
next day and provided that "[o]nly a marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California. 4 2 Also in 2000, by
contrast, Nebraska amended its constitution to provide that "[o]nly
marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in
Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union,
domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not
be valid or recognized in Nebraska."4
This language places the Nebraska policy in stark contrast to that
of California. It is no stretch to assume that the inclusion of the
words "civil union" in the Nebraska amendment was in direct
response to Vermont's new Civil Union Bill. Clearly, a claim to full
faith and credit for a civil union in Nebraska would face potential
insuperable obstacles. By contrast, California's statute applies only to
refuse recognition of same-sex marriages and makes no statement on
37. Id. § 1201(2).
38. See id. § 1203.
39. See id. § 1202.
40. See id. § 1204.
41. See Toni Broaddus, Vote No If You Believe in Marriage: Lessons from the No on
Knight/No on Proposition 22 Campaign, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2000).
42. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West Supp. 2002).
43. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (emphasis added); see also De Franco, supra note 33, at
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civil unions per se.44 In fact, California legislation now includes a
statewide domestic partnership statute that provides certain civil
partnership rights to same-sex couples." It would seem that the mere
existence of this domestic partnership statute practically precludes the
California legislature from enacting a marriage-evasion statute with
language that disallows same-sex civil unions."
F. Summary
It should be apparent, then, that we are in a time of tension
between progressive and traditional attitudes towards same-sex
partnerships and marriages. While Vermont, Hawaii, and California
seem to be charting new territory on their own, their developments
have created a substantial national impact. Other states and the
federal government have quickly and purposely scrambled to define
their respective attitudes on the matter so as to preserve the local
status quo with the wand of state sovereignty. Many commentators
have argued that these efforts have been an affront to the dignity of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.47
A question that has not truly been posed thus far, however, is what
obligation does Vermont, Hawaii, or California have to enforce a
same-sex non-marital union solemnized in another of the three? To
begin to answer that question, Part II will discuss the general
mechanics of the Full Faith and Credit Clause with respect to the civil
union.
II. Full Faith and Credit
A. Introduction
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides
that "[f]ull Faith and Credit must be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."4
However, states owe different credit to laws (legislative measures and
common law) than to judgments." The obligation is "exacting" as to
44. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5.
45. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2002).
46. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
47. See, e.g., Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage
Act in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 263 (1997).
48. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
49. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (holding that an
injunction which was entered by a Michigan county court did not reach beyond the
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judgments," such that a judgment entered in one state must be
respected in another provided that the first state had jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter.' Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has held that "credit must be given to the judgment of
another state although the forum [state] would not be required to
entertain the suit on which the judgment was founded."52
However, the same rule does not necessarily apply to statutory
law. The Constitution does not compel a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject
matter on which the state is competent to legislate.53 The Supreme
Court in Nevada v. Hall observed that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause only requires a state to apply another state's statutory law
when not in violation of its own legitimate public policy. 4 Some
states, like California, have their own policy rules that further limit or
direct the use of local policy in deciding whether to afford credit to
the acts and records of other states." Furthermore, marriages are
subject to a variety of additional choice of law rules depending on the
jurisdiction. 6
Before the policy rules of California are discussed in the next
section, this section will discuss some basic but important issues
regarding the validity of applying full faith and credit at all in the
current situation: whether the DOMA places restrictions on a state's
obligation to give effect to another state's civil union scheme; to what
extent California's little DOMA impairs recognition of a civil union
under full faith and credit; and whether a civil union fits the definition
of an "act" or "record" for purposes of the clause.
B. The DOMA & Full Faith and Credit
The DOMA purports to restrict a state's obligation to give full
faith and credit to a valid same-sex marriage created in a different
controversy to control proceedings elsewhere, and thus, plaintiff could testify in Missouri
action brought against defendant without offense to Full Faith and Credit Clause).
50. Id. at 233.
51. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not require California to limit recovery to the $25,000 maximum limitation in
Nevada's statutory waiver of its immunity from suit in its own courts).
52. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (concluding
that a judgment is not to be denied full faith and credit in state and federal courts merely
because it is for taxes).
53. Baker, 522 U.S. at 232.
54. Nevada, 440 U.S. at 422.
55. See discussion infra Part III.A.
56. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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state. 7 It is not clear whether the DOMA applies equally to civil
unions. However, the reasons why the DOMA should not be a
roadblock to this discussion are threefold: the civil union is not a
marriage; the civil union is probably not sufficiently "treated as a
marriage" to bring it within the DOMA's jurisdiction; and even if the
DOMA did control the interstate effect of the Vermont civil union, it
would only serve to remove a federal obligation, and California
would still be bound by its own choice of law rules. The pertinent
language of the DOMA provides:
No State ... shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession,
or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship."
Although it is unclear what it means for a relationship to be
"treated as a marriage," it seems clear that the civil union is not
defined as a marriage by the Vermont statute, which provides:
"Civil Union" means that two eligible persons have established arelationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive the benefits
and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of
59spouses ....
"Marriage" means the legally recognized union of one man and one
woman.
For a civil union to be established in Vermont, it shall be necessary
that the parties to a civil union satisfy all of the following criteria:
(1) Not to be a party to another civil union or marriage.
(2) Be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the
marriage laws of this state .... 61
Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections
and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute,
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other
source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.
By the definitions in the statute, it appears that Vermont does
not mean to treat the civil union as a marriage under its laws. In fact,
it appears that a civil marriage and a civil union are created different
as a compromise between satisfying the Common Benefits Clause of
the Vermont Constitution and upholding the longstanding traditions
57. See discussion supra Part I.C.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (emphasis added).
59. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (Supp. 2001).
60. Id. § 1201(4).
61. Id. §§ 1202(1), 1202(2).
62. Id. § 1204(a).
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of ciil • 63of civil marriage. Additionally, recent decisions in the Georgia
Court of Appeals have interpreted Vermont's civil union bill to hold
that the civil union is not to be treated as a marriage at least for
determinations of custody.' If it is true that the civil union is not
"treated as a marriage under the laws" of Vermont, the DOMA
should have no effect on the full faith and credit given to the civil
union, and we should be free to examine the civil union in terms of a
regular full faith and credit analysis.
Even if the civil union is "treated as a marriage" sufficiently to be
within the jurisdiction of the DOMA, this only serves to remove
California's federal obligation to give full faith and credit. California
is still subject to its own rules concerning the effect of sister state
statutes. Furthermore, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
mandate recognition of an act or statute to the same extent that it
mandates recognition of a court judgment." Even prior to the
DOMA, California was not required to give full faith and credit to
another state's statute if the statute contravened California's public
policy." Determining whether California must recognize a civil union
from Vermont will ultimately require an inquiry into California policy
because California, by its own law, obliges itself to recognize a sister
state's statute when that statute is not contrary to its own public
policy.67 The DOMA serves only to remove California's obligation to
recognize judgments from other states but has no substantial effect on
other states' statutes.6' The DOMA, then, should not play an integral
63. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 1(10).
64. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In Burns, Susan
Burns divorced her husband, Darian, in December 1995. Id. at 48. Darian retained full
custody of the couple's three minor children. Id. Three years later, the court issued a
consent order modifying visitation rights and providing: "[t]here shall be no visitation nor
residence by the children with either party during any time where such party cohabits with
or has overnight stays with any adult to which such party is not legally married or to whom
party is not related within the second degree." Id. (alteration in original). On July 3, 2000,
Susan Burns traveled to Vermont and obtained a civil union with a female companion not
related to Susan. Id. Two months later Darian filed a motion for contempt, alleging that
Susan violated the trial court's order by exercising her visitation rights while cohabiting
with her female lover. Id. The trial court found that the provisions of its order applied
equally to both parties and that a civil union was not a marriage. Id. The Georgia Court
of Appeals affirmed, finding that a civil union was not a marriage, noting the specific
language of the legislative findings that accompanied the Vermont Civil Union bill that
provided that "a system of civil unions does not bestow the status of a civil marriage." Id.
at 49 (quoting 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 1(10)).
65. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998).
66. Id.
67. See infra Part IIl.
68. It is possible that a civil unionized couple might seek a declaratory judgment from
a court in Vermont and thereby defeat the policy inquiry mandated for Acts and Records
but not for Judgments.
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part in our discussion of what effect a sister state must give to the civil
union.
C. California's DOMA & Full Faith and Credit
The California Defense of Marriage Act" codifies California's
policy not to give effect to a valid same-sex marriage created
elsewhere." This marriage-evasion statute should not apply to the
civil union for several reasons. For one, the language of the statute
simply provides that "[o]nly a marriage between a man and a woman
is valid or recognized in California."7' Unlike its federal counterpart,
California Family Code section 308.5 does not require that the
relationship be "treated" as a marriage or mention single-sex
relationships at all. And, as discussed above, there should be no
question that Vermont defines the civil union as something other than
a marriage. Secondly, California's existing domestic partnership
statutes specifically extend rights to same-sex relationships.72 It would
therefore be counterintuitive to argue that California's marriage-
evasion statute applies to deny recognition of rights to same-sex
relationships in any form. Finally, if California wanted to preclude
recognition of a civil union specifically, it could have done so
expressly by statute as other states such as Nebraska73 have done.
D. Is the Civil Union an "Act, Record, or Judicial Proceeding"?
At first glance, it might seem necessary to discuss whether a civil
union really fits the definitional requirements of the Full Faith and
Credit clause.74 Is the civil union an "Act"? Is it a "Record"? As it
turns out, there is no need to strain to find a place for the statutorily-
created civil union amid the "public Act, Record, or judicial
Proceeding" language of the clause-it is well settled that a statute is
an "Act" within the meaning of the clause.75
69. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West Supp. 2002).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2002).
73. See Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong. 32 n.33 (1996) (statement of Prof. Lynn D. Wardle citing fifteen
states that have included in their marriage-evasion statute language that pertains also to
civil unions).
74. Article four, section 1 of U.S. Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State."
75. See Ala. Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Tenn.
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
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A party to a civil union could seek a declaratory judgment in a
Vermont court, declaring the full extent of the party's rights under
the civil union. Because a court judgment would not only satisfy the
language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but also obligate
recognition in a sister state, a party could then seek to have the
judgment enforced and escape the policy inquiry required for
enforcing another state's statute. Interestingly, this would resurrect
the relevance of the DOMA in our discussion. If the DOMA truly
applied to a civil union as well as a marriage, even a declaratory
judgment from a Vermont trial court recognizing a party's rights
under a civil union would be subject to the forum state's policy
inquiry because the forum state would no longer be required to give
full faith and credit to the civil union. This serves to reiterate the




As the previous section discussed, California Family Code
section 308.5 does not positively deny the operation of the Vermont
civil union in California.76 The DOMA, at most, places the discretion
at the state level.
It is therefore necessary to discuss the civil union's fate in
California according to California public policy doctrine. It is, of
course, difficult to predict the policy of a state in acknowledging a
right newly created by another state. California precedent has
nonetheless provided some guidelines in determining its own policy.
In the silence of any express rule affirming, denying, or
restraining the operation of foreign laws, California courts presume
the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless they are
repugnant to its policy.77 Many rights acquired under the laws of
other states are now protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and may not be refused under California domestic policy.7 8 In fact,
the First District Court of Appeal in California has held that even
regular California policy is not strong enough to justify a refusal to
grant full faith and credit." California requires a "strong public
76. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West Supp. 2002).
77. See In re Lathrop's Estate, 131 P. 752, 754 (Cal. 1913).
78. See 12 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Conflicts § 11 (1999).
79. See Metro. Creditors Serv. v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Ct. App. 1993).
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policy" against another state's practice before it will refuse to
recognize it."'
California's narrower' public policy doctrine has been further
interpreted to apply only where another state's law violates
"recognized standards of morality, would contravene the positive
policy of the state or some deep-rooted tradition of the commonweal,
would be contrary to principles of abstract justice, or would be
injurious to the welfare or general interests of the people of [the]
state." 2 Furthermore, a mere difference in law does not mean it is
against public policy,"3 and even laws that offend California policy will
be recognized, in some instances, for certain purposes. For example,
a polygamous marriage may be recognized in California to give
succession rights to widows. 4
How, then, do we determine whether a foreign, same-sex, non-
marital civil union violates the strong public policy, deep-rooted
traditions, or recognized standards of California morality? California
precedent tells us that that its policy is primarily indicated by the
California Constitution, secondly by its statutes, and finally by its case
law. 5 This section will analyze California policy by these standards
and others.
80. See 12 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Conflicts § 12 (1999); Metro. Creditors, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 649.
81. See Metro. Creditors, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648.
82. 12 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Conflicts § 22 (1999) (citations omitted).
83. See McGrew v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 64 P. 103 (Cal. 1901) (holding that a divorce in
obtained in Hawaii for an insane man by his guardian was not invalid simply California
law did not expressly permit a divorce action by the husband's guardian).
84. See In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (holding
that where only the question of descent of property is involved, "public policy" as to
polygamous marriages, legal at the place of contract but illegal in California, is not
affected).
85. See Thome v. Macken, 136 P.2d 116,119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943):
Where there are constitutional or statutory provisions, they govern as to what is
the public policy. Where the lawmaking power speaks on a particular subject
over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such a case is
what the statute enacts. The United States Supreme Court said in United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association [that] [t]he public policy of the
government is to be found in its statutes, and, when they have not directly
spoken, then in the decisions of the courts... but when the lawmaking power
speaks upon a particular subject ... public policy in such a case is what the
statute enacts.
(citations omitted).
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B. California Constitution as an Indicator of California Policy
The California Constitution guarantees rights and freedoms in a
fashion that resembles the Common Benefits Clause 6 of the Vermont
Constitution on which Baker v. State was decided. In so doing, it
suggests a policy that would favor extending full faith and credit to
the Vermont civil union. California's Constitution provides that all
people have inalienable rights, including the right to pursue and
obtain safety, happiness, and privacy; that no person may be deprived
of liberty without due process of law or denied equal protection of the
laws; and that no citizen or class of citizens may be granted privileges
or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. 7
In Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,8 the California Supreme Court interpreted the California equal
protection clause to include homosexuals in its protection." There,
individuals and equal rights associations sought declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief against the Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Company on the ground that it engaged in discriminatory
employment practices that violated the equal protection guarantee of
the California Constitution.90 The Court held that the state equal
protection clause clearly applied in the employment realm and that it
applied to homosexuals as well as to all others."
California's constitution, therefore, has been interpreted to have
no strong and legitimate policy interest in denying individuals in
same-sex relationships rights, protections, benefits, and
responsibilities comparable to those provided to married couples. In
86. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
87. CAL. CONST. art. I §§ 1, 7.
88. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
89. Id. at 597.
90. Id. at 595.
91. Id. at 597. The court explained:
Plaintiffs contend that PT&T's alleged discriminatory employment practices
violate the equal protection guarantee of the California Constitution by
arbitrarily denying qualified homosexuals employment opportunities afforded
other individuals. In analyzing this constitutional contention, we begin from the
premise that both the state and federal equal protection clauses clearly prohibit
the state or any governmental entity from arbitrarily discriminating against any
class of individuals in employment decisions. Moreover, past decisions of this
court establish that this general constitutional principle applies to homosexuals as
well as to all other members of our polity; under California law, the state may not
exclude homosexuals as a class from employment opportunities without a
showing that an individual's homosexuality renders him unfit for the job from
which he has been excluded.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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fact, it appears that the California Constitution mandates a policy in
favor of providing all eligible couples, regardless of their gender or
sexual orientation, the opportunity to obtain comparable rights.
Under existing California law, the legal recognition of a civil marriage
is the only available source for a couple to access many rights,
protections, benefits, and responsibilities. "2 Because civil marriage is
not available to same-sex couples, the existing framework, in practice,
is not consistent with to the spirit of the California Constitution.
C. California Statutes as an Indicator of California Policy
California's domestic partnership statute93 acknowledges the
state's policy and interest in recognizing same-sex relationships,
providing equal treatment to individuals in these relationships, and
ending discrimination on the bases of gender and sexual orientation.94
The domestic partnership statute enables domestic partners to make
medical decisions for incapacitated loved ones, adopt a partner's
child, use sick leave to care for a partner, recover damages for
92. See A.B. 1338, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001-02). The California codes
currently provide a variety of rights available only to married person including:
laws relating to domestic relations.... including rights and obligations of support
during and after the relationship, community property, and evidentiary
privileges[;] laws relating to child custody and visitation and stepparent
adoption[;] laws relating to title, probate, administration of estates, intestate
succession, or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership, or transfer of real or
personal property during life or at death, as well as laws relating to access to
marital student housing, senior citizen housing, and rent control protections[;]
laws relating to obligations to make disclosures regarding spousal relationships
and to take other steps to prevent conflicts of interest and self-dealing[;] laws
relating to government benefits, including... workers' compensation,
unemployment insurance, public assistance, transfer of licenses upon death, and
the ability to apply for absentee ballots and other documents for a spouse[;] laws
relating to taxes, including, but not limited to, joint filing of income tax returns,
marital tax rates, marital tax exemptions, estate tax exemptions, nontaxable
treatment of employer-provided spousal insurance benefits, and nonreassessment
of real property upon a spouse's death[;] laws relating to health insurance
coverage for spouses, family care and medical leave, bereavement leave, and
coverage of spouses under medical, dental, life, and disability insurance[;] laws
relating to legal claims related to, or dependent upon, spousal status, including,
but not limited to, claims for wrongful death, intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, loss of consortium, and victim's compensation rights[;] laws
relating to hospital visitation, medical consent, conservatorship, guardianship,
anatomical gifts, disposition of remains, and rights of burial in family
cemeteriesl;] and laws prohibiting marital status discrimination.
Id.




wrongful death, and be named as conservator of a partner's will.95
Most recently, California passed Senate Bill 1661, which establishes
six weeks wage replacement benefits to workers who take time off
work to care for a seriously ill child, spouse, parent, domestic partner,
or to bond with a new child." The inclusion of domestic partners in
this new legislation clearly furthers California's efforts to legitimize
the special legal relationship between same-sex couples.
At the very least, the mere existence of the domestic partnership
statute in California suggests that California could not have a "strong
policy" against extending rights to same-sex relationships that are
available to different-sex couples through marriage. Furthermore,
while the domestic partnership statute does not go to the full extent
of the Vermont Civil Union in extending all benefits to same-sex
couples, a mere difference in law does not necessarily indicate a
strong public policy against the foreign law.
The historical and statutory notes of the statute provide even
more insight into California's policy on extending benefits to same-
sex partners. California Governor Gray Davis issued the following
signing message when he signed the domestic partnership statute in
October 2001:
In California, a legal marriage is between a man and a woman. 1
believe the only things that can undermine the bonds of a strong
marriage are ignorance and fear.
This legislation does nothing to contradict or undermine the
definition of a legal marriage, nor is it about special rights. It is
about civil rights, respect, responsibility, and, most of all, it is about
family.
Therefore, I am honored to sign one of the strongest domestic
partner laws in the nation.97
It appears evident, then, that California wants to encourage the
inclusion of homosexuals in its protections of rights and that
California sees same-sex relationships as legitimate families as an
alternative to marriage. In more general terms, California statutes
serve as evidence of the state's policy to protect the rights of same-sex
couples by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in many areas including, but not limited to, employment,"
95. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 historical and statutory notes (West Supp. 2002).
96. A.B. 1661, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
97. CAL. FAM. CODE §297 historical and statutory notes (West 2001).
98. CAL. GOV. CODE § 12940 (West 2001).
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housing," health contracts,"'" hate crimes,'' judicial ethics,"2 criminal
law,"" juror excuse and disqualification,"'
4 and court appointments. °5
However, this inquiry into California policy as expressed in
California statutes would not be complete without noting the recent
California Assembly Bill 1338.106 Assembly Bill 1338 proposed to
create a system of civil unions in California almost identical in spirit
to the Vermont system,"'7 but, pursuant to article IV, section 10(c) of
the California Constitution,"" was extinguished when it had not been
passed by January 31 of the second calendar year after its proposal.
The bill provided:
Existing law provides for the issuance of a marriage license and
specifies the rights and obligations of married persons. Existing law
provides that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized. This bill would provide for the issuance of a civil union
license, and provide that the rights and obligations of a civil union,
99. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12955 (West Supp. 2002).
100. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1365.5 (West 2001).
101. CAL. CIV. CODE §51.7 (West 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §422.6 (West 2001).
102. See Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 227 n.10
(Cal. 1998).
103. CAL. PENAL CODE §422.6 (West 2001).
104. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 204,231.5 (West Supp. 2002).
105. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231.5 (West Supp. 2002).
106. See A.B. 1338, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 200 t-02).
107. California's proposed civil union bill not only embodied the spirit of Vermont's
civil union, but anticipated the future struggle of Californians to have their civil unions
recognized elsewhere. The proposed bill provided:
It is the further intent of the Legislature that this act shall be construed broadly
to equalize civil union and civil marriage under all applicable laws of any
jurisdiction that may affect or govern the rights of married persons in every other
state, the District of Columbia, the United States, and any foreign country, to the
fullest extent of applicable law, including the Constitution of the United States
and the California Constitution, to the end that no party to a civil union shall be
treated any differently than a married person as to his or her rights, benefits, and
responsibilities under the laws of every jurisdiction that recognizes and accords
rights, benefits, and responsibilities to a person who has been married or whose
marriage had been recognized under California law.
Id. Had Vermont included similar language in its civil union statute the discussion of this
Note would obviously be altered significantly. Or would it? Is a state obligated to give
full faith and credit to a statute of a sister state simply because the sister state statute itself
says so? What, then, of states like Nebraska whose marriage-evasion statutes clearly
provide that they will not give any effect to sister state civil unions?
108. See http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_1301-1350/ab_1338 bill_20020207_
history.html. Article IV section 10(c) of the California Constitution provides: "Any bill
introduced during the first year of the biennium of the legislative session that has not been
passed by the house of origin by January 31 of the second calendar year of the biennium
may no longer be acted on by the house."
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which could be entered into by any two persons, are the same as
those of a marriage. '
Although the bill died without a vote, the legislature's reluctance
to address the bill should at least be noted. This should serve as a
reminder that, in so much as the California Legislature is an
indication of California policy, this part of the discussion is not a
"slam dunk." It remains the opinion of this author, however, that
while the death of Assembly Bill 1338 marks some resistance to
extending full rights to same-sex relationships, it does not meet the
California standards of a "strong policy" against extending those
rights.
D. California Case Law as an Indicator of California Policy
Gay Law Students" " is not the only California opinion that serves
to identify a state-wide policy of favoring the protection of
homosexual rights. People v. Garcia, for example, held that
homosexuals cannot be excluded from jury selection on that basis."'
In Leibert v. Transworld Systems, Inc., the California Court of Appeal
held that there was a fundamental public policy against discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation which was evident from California
Labor Code sections 1101, 1102 and 1102.1 (now incorporated in
California Government Code section 12900).12 In Holmes v.
California National Guard, the Court of Appeal held that the federal
"don't ask don't tell" policy of excluding homosexuals who affirm
their homosexuality in the armed services violates the California
Constitution and cannot be applied to discriminate against employing
homosexuals in the California National Guard."3  In Nadler v.
Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that a party's
homosexuality was only a factor in determining a child custody case
and could no longer, on its own, be determinative of the child's best
interests."4 Finally, the California Court of Appeal in In re Joshua H.
also held that California's "hate crime" statutes"' do not violate
freedom of speech since they do not proscribe expression; rather, they
proscribe "an especially egregious type of conduct, that is, of selecting
109. See A.B. 1338, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
110. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
111. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 348 (Ct. App. 2000).
112. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 72 (Ct. App. 1995).
113. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 154, 172 (Ct. App. 2001).
114. See 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1967).
115. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.6-422.95(West 2001).
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crime victims on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, or sexual orientation.""' 6
While California case law does not expressly prescribe that
California mandate a system of civil unions for same-sex marriage, it
does illustrate a trend in the judiciary of protecting the civil rights of
homosexuals. By contrast, California case law also illustrates the very
real roadblock that same-sex couples face in receiving their
constitutionally guaranteed right of equal protection of the laws. In
1985, the Third District Court of Appeal in Hinman v. Department of
Personnel Administration considered whether the denial of dental
benefit coverage to unmarried partners of homosexual state
employees unlawfully discriminates and violates the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution."7 The intermediate court held
that rather than discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, the
dental plans distinguish eligibility on the basis of marriage, which is a
distinction rationally related to a legitimate state purpose: the state's
interest in promoting marriage."' The court then commented that the
plaintiffs' only true recourse would be in convincing the legislature to
redefine marriage so as not to exist only as a union between a man
and a woman."'
While this appellate opinion was written more than fifteen years
before the enactment of the current domestic partnership statute, it
does serve to show the California judiciary's reluctance to call a
system that bestows rights only on married persons a violation of
equal protection. While the Court of Appeal in Hinman saw the
plaintiffs' only recourse in redefining the definition of marriage, 2" the
Vermont high court in Baker saw the potential of an alternative
remedy-the one ultimately chosen by the Vermont Legislature-of
creating a mirror system of rights under the civil union.' 2' What is
essential to note, however, is that while the California Court of
Appeal found no equal protection violation on the basis of marital
status, its dicta did at least recognize that marriage was not equally
accessible to all plaintiffs.
116. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 293 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis in original).
117. 213 Cal. Rptr. 410,411 (Ct. App. 1985).
118. Id. at 419.
119. Id. at 419-20.
120. Id.
121. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999).
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E. California Marriage Policy-Apples and Oranges
This Note holds tightly to the premise that a civil marriage and a
civil union are not the same legal entity and should not be treated as
such. Some recent scholarship suggests that it is possible to
determine a state's policy on a foreign civil union by looking at that
state's policy on foreign marriages.' It is not clear, however, that
such an inquiry is appropriate or useful.
California has a policy that favors marriage in general.2 2 Thus,
for marriages, California follows the general rule that the law of the
place of the contraction of the marriage controls the question of its
validity. 24  In addition, California has other pro-validation rules
concerning foreign marriages. For example, an intent on the part of
the parties to evade California marriage law by going to another state
only to contract a marriage that could not lawfully be entered into in
California, has no effect on the validity of the marriage. 125 In other
words, California does not penalize couples who have specifically
gone out of state to marry in such a way that evades California law
(such as age or health requirements) only to immediately return to
California and seek to have their new status enforced.'26  An
exception to this policy arises where the marriage is deemed "odious
by common consent of nations", such as, incestuous or polygamous
marriages,' 27 but even in such cases, California courts have deemed
those marriages valid for some purposes such as succession rights to
property.
It would therefore be tempting to discuss whether a civil union is
more akin to an underage marriage or more akin to a polygamous
marriage. However attractive such a comparison may be, it is
nonetheless analogous to the proverbial apples-and-oranges
comparison. Proponents of same-sex rights might urge a California
court not to inquire into the intent of a same-sex couple who evades
California law by entering into a foreign civil union. Meanwhile,
122. See De Franco, supra note 33, at 258.
123. See Hendricks v. Hendricks, 270 P.2d 80, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) ("It is
fundamental that a marriage contract differs from other contractual relations in that there
exists a definite and vital public interest in reference to the marriage relation.").




128. See In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (holding
that where a decedent legally entered into polygamous marriages in a foreign jurisdiction,
California will not deem such marriages invalid as contrary to California policy when the
purpose of recognizing such a marriage is to divide the decedent's estate).
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opponents of the civil union might seek to define same-sex
relationships as marriages that are "odious by common consent of
nations." However, each of those arguments is intrinsically flawed to
the extent that it assumes state policy on marriage could be compared
to state policy on civil unions. An argument that offers California's
liberal policy of validating evasive marriages as evidence of a liberal
policy towards validating foreign same-sex unions is crippled by the
fact that California's definite interest in preserving marriage does not
necessarily extend to civil unions. ' By the same token, an argument
that proposes that California policy sees the civil union as a marriage
that is "odious by common consent of nations" is belied by the fact
that California statutorily excludes same-sex relationships from ever
being considered as a "marriage" in the first place. It is therefore
tempting, but impossible, to properly compare general marriage
policy with the policy of extending marital benefits to same-sex
couples.
Conclusion
This Note set out to determine the extent of California's
obligation to recognize the rights afforded to a civilly unionized same-
sex couple under Vermont state law. The federal DOMA neither
mandates nor precludes California's recognition of non-marital rights
created by other states' statutes. The language of California's own
defense of marriage statute applies strictly to marriages and leaves
little room for an apples-and-oranges analogy between marriage and
the civil union. California doctrine is clear: California policy alone
dictates whether a sister state statute is afforded full faith and credit
in California. Such policy is specifically evidenced by California's
constitution, statutes, and case law-pro-equal protection policy
towards same-sex citizens is exhibited clearly in the California
Constitution, the domestic partnership scheme, various state statutes,
and California case law.
It is therefore without hesitation that this author suggests that
California practice what it preaches: a California court must afford
full faith and credit to the Vermont civil union statute in the event
129. One could argue that the equal protection guarantees provided for in Article 7 of
the California Constitution extend California's policy of promoting marriage to include a
policy that promotes civil unions or domestic partnerships. It is evident that such an
argument fails based on the premise of this section, that a civil marriage and a civil union
are not analogous. Furthermore, the overwhelming approval of Proposition 22 in
California is clear evidence of a public sentiment that keeps the institutions of marriage
and domestic partnerships separate from a policy standpoint.
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such a question is properly before it. Stepping beyond the premise of
this Note, it appears that both the language and spirit of the
California Constitution create a duty in the legislature to enact a
statute that provides same-sex Californians with the rights guaranteed
to them by California's equal protection provision. By the same
token, a responsible California legislature should also enact a statute
that clearly defines California's policy towards recognition of state
civil unions, reciprocal beneficiaries, and domestic partnerships. And,
in drafting such a provision, the legislature should look deep into the
rights guaranteed by the state's constitution, the policies exhibited by
its existing codes, the case law as handed down by its able judiciary,
and the words of its current governor.

